Putting Hot Cholent on Cold Salad on Shabbos
Before entering Mitzraim, Avraham asked his wife Sarah to tell them that she is his sister. He did this so that the Egyptians would not think that he was her husband and kill him in order to take Sarah for Pharoah.
The Midrash Pliah teaches that from here we learn that we can slaughter an animal on Shabbos for someone who is sick (and their life is in danger).
What is the connection between Avraham’s actions and the specific law that we slaughter an animal for one who is sick on Shabbos?
Some commentators explain that from Avraham’s actions, we learn that we do not rely on miracles and need to take action to protect our lives. In a similar way, the Torah obligates us to break Shabbos in order to save someone’s life, rather than keep Shabbos and rely on miracles.
Others explain that just as Avraham asked Sarah to sin by lying in order to save his life, so too we are allowed to break Shabbos to slaughter an animal for a person who is sick, whose life is in danger.
Both of these explanations do not explain why the Midrash gives the specific example of slaughtering an animal. The Midrash could have simply said that from Avraham’s actions we learn that we break Shabbos for one who sick.
The Lubavitcher Rebbe[1] presents a novel explanation of this Midrash based on the rationale behind this law of Shechting for a Choleh on Shabbos.
The Chiddush of this law is that even if we had non-Kosher meat (Neveilah) that could be served to the sick person without having to desecrate Shabbos by Shechting, we still slaughter an animal to give the sick person Kosher food, rather than serve them the non-Kosher food[2].
Seemingly it would be preferable in this case to give the non-Kosher meat to the sick person. Just like the laws of Shabbos are suspended in cases of Pikuach Nefesh, so too are the laws of Kashrus. Further, eating non-Kosher meat is a lesser-degree of prohibition than breaking Shabbos, incurring only the punishment of lashes rather than execution[3].
So why don’t we do this?
There are 3 primary explanations for this ruling.
The Rosh[4] writes that technically it would be preferable to give the sick person the non-Kosher meat rather than break Shabbos by Shechting. However, we are concerned that the sick person will be disgusted by the thought of eating the non-Kosher food and will refuse to eat. This would endanger their life.
Another rationale is that the non-Kosher meat is intrinsically forbidden and is therefore something Megunah (disgusting)[5]. In contrast, the actions performed on Shabbos are only forbidden because it is Shabbos. We are allowed to push off the laws of Shabbos for the Choleh anyway, to light a fire and to cook. Therefore we may Shecht as well, rather than give them non-Kosher[6].
The Ra”n[7] gives a different explanation. Shechting an animal would be a single action incurring only 1 violation, albeit more severe. However, when eating non-Kosher food, one transgresses for each Kezayis volume that they eat. Even though eating non-Kosher food is less severe, the combined violations outweigh the singular violation of Shechting.
The Rebbe’s explanation of the Midrash is based on this rationale of the Ra”n. Why did Avraham fear that the Egyptians would kill him in order to take Sarah to Pharaoh instead of just taking her as a married woman?
If they did not kill Avraham, Pharaoh would be committing an act of adultery each time. In this case it would be preferable to kill Avraham, committing a one-off act of murder (like Shechting the animal on Shabbos), rather than violating multiple acts of adultery[8] (like the multiple violations when eating non-Kosher).
The Poskim discuss a number of Nafka Minas, practical differences between the reasons behind the ruling enumerated above.
Some suggest that according to the rationale of the Rosh, if we could hide the fact that the meat was not Kosher, so that there would be no concern that the sick person would refuse to eat it, it would be preferable to give them the non-Kosher meat[9]. Others disagree, writing that the concern is that they may come to find out that the meat is not Kosher. Even if they were to become aware after eating, their disgust at that point could endanger them.
If the sick person knows that the food is not Kosher and knows that they will not be disgusted because they understand that it is for Pikuach Nefesh, the reason of the Rosh would no longer apply and it would be preferable to eat the non-Kosher rather than Shecht on Shabbos[10].
The same would apply in other cases where there is no concern of the person being disgusted, such as a young child[11].
According to the reasoning of the Ra”n, it would make no difference whether the Choleh was unaware or if they consented to eat the non-Kosher food. We would still Shecht rather than allow them to transgress the multiple prohibitions.
Some Poskim question the opinion of the Ra”n. What if the Choleh does not require or is unable to eat a full Kezayis? Does the law change in this case?
When quoting the rationale of the Ra”n, the Magen Avraham[12] writes that one transgresses the Biblical prohibition of eating non-Kosher even if they eat less than a Kzayis volume[13]. The Kezayis volume is only the minimum volume required to be punishable. The implication is that every tiny amount eating is a separate Issur to which the Ran’s concern would apply.
Shulchan Aruch Harav[14] and other Acharonim[15] bring all 3 rationales for the Halacha. Ketzos Hashulchan learns that each one on its own would be sufficient to rely on.
Rabbinically Prohibited food
The Rishonim discuss the case of Neveilah, being food that is Biblically forbidden. Would we be allowed to Shecht (or cook) Kosher food in order to avoid giving the Choleh food that is Rabbinically forbidden, such as Chalav Akum or Bishul Akum?
The Pri Megadim[16] has a doubt in this case. Based on the rationale of the Rosh, perhaps a person only becomes disgusted by the thought of eating Biblically forbidden foods. If so, it would be preferable to give them the Rabbinically forbidden food. But perhaps we are concerned that a person will be disgusted at the prospect of eating even something that is only Rabbinically forbidden yes. In this case he says we rely on asking the Choleh[17].
According to the reasoning of the Ra”n, there is also a doubt. Do we say that multiple Rabbinic prohibitions when eating Rabbinically forbidden foods also outweigh a single Biblical prohibition such as Shechting on Shabbos? Or does this only apply to eating Biblically forbidden foods.
Whilst there are some Poskim[18] who rule leniently, most Acharonim[19] rule that it in this case, we must rather give the Choleh the Rabbinically forbidden food than to Biblically violate Shabbos to precure Kosher food. If the Shabbos violation to precure Kosher food is only Rabbinic, such as separating Terumah and Maaser, all opinions would rule that this is preferable to giving the Choleh Rabbinically forbidden food.
If the sick person is adamant that they will not eat the Rabbinically forbidden food and as a result there is a risk to their life, one may Shecht or perform Biblical violations to be able to give them food that they will eat.
An analogous case to these laws in a modern-day context would be if a person is sick in a hospital that has no Kosher food. Like Shechting, a Jew would be able to bring food to the hospital by carrying it through a Reshus Harabim, even though it would entail a Biblical Shabbos violation[20].
[1] Likutei Sichos volume 15 p487. Also see Torah Shleimah
[2] All of this assumes that the delay of having to slaughter an animal will not risk the patient’s life. If they need to eat immediately, they should be given whatever is available. Raavad. The case is where the Choleh specifically requires meat.
[3] The Rashb”a (Teshuvos 1:689) writes that according to the view that Shabbos is merely pushed aside (Hudcha) in cases of Pikuach Nefesh, it would be the same as the laws of Kashrus and accordingly we would give the sick person the non-Kosher food. The Mahram’s lenient ruling follows the opinion that the laws of Shabbos are completely permissible in cases of Pikuach Nefesh as though it was a weekday (Hutra). Since we follow the view that Shabbos is Hudcha, we would not follow the Maharam’s ruling.
[4] Yoma 14, Teshuvos Klal 26:5 based on the Mahara”m
[5] Non-Kosher food has a spiritual impact on the person who eats it (Ritzba).
[6] Shulchan Aruch Harav 328:16
[7] Yoma 4b
[8] See Likutei Sichos for an explanation why the act of adultery in this case would be a less-severe transgression than murder
[9] Imrei Binah
[10] Radba”z 4:200. Brought in Pri Megadim Eshel Avraham 328:10 and Elya Rabbah
[11] Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 92:8 and Ketzos Hashulchan 135:8
[12] 328:9
[13] The law of Chatzi Shiur Asur Min Hatorah
[14] 328:16
[15] See Aruch Hashulchan
[16] Eshel Avraham 328:9
[17] In the case of a Biblical prohibition we don’t rely on asking the Choleh
[18] Bach, Ta”z
[19] Magen Avraham 328:9, Shulchan Aruch Harav 328:16, Mishna Berura 328:39
[20] Some Poskim suggest that this only applies to walking the food to the hospital which entails a singular violation. However, when driving a petrol-car, one violates the Melacha of kindling constantly. According to the Ra”n this would not be permissible. However, according to the other reasonings, even this would be permissible.
The Midrash Pliah teaches that from here we learn that we can slaughter an animal on Shabbos for someone who is sick (and their life is in danger).
What is the connection between Avraham’s actions and the specific law that we slaughter an animal for one who is sick on Shabbos?
Some commentators explain that from Avraham’s actions, we learn that we do not rely on miracles and need to take action to protect our lives. In a similar way, the Torah obligates us to break Shabbos in order to save someone’s life, rather than keep Shabbos and rely on miracles.
Others explain that just as Avraham asked Sarah to sin by lying in order to save his life, so too we are allowed to break Shabbos to slaughter an animal for a person who is sick, whose life is in danger.
Both of these explanations do not explain why the Midrash gives the specific example of slaughtering an animal. The Midrash could have simply said that from Avraham’s actions we learn that we break Shabbos for one who sick.
The Lubavitcher Rebbe[1] presents a novel explanation of this Midrash based on the rationale behind this law of Shechting for a Choleh on Shabbos.
The Chiddush of this law is that even if we had non-Kosher meat (Neveilah) that could be served to the sick person without having to desecrate Shabbos by Shechting, we still slaughter an animal to give the sick person Kosher food, rather than serve them the non-Kosher food[2].
Seemingly it would be preferable in this case to give the non-Kosher meat to the sick person. Just like the laws of Shabbos are suspended in cases of Pikuach Nefesh, so too are the laws of Kashrus. Further, eating non-Kosher meat is a lesser-degree of prohibition than breaking Shabbos, incurring only the punishment of lashes rather than execution[3].
So why don’t we do this?
There are 3 primary explanations for this ruling.
The Rosh[4] writes that technically it would be preferable to give the sick person the non-Kosher meat rather than break Shabbos by Shechting. However, we are concerned that the sick person will be disgusted by the thought of eating the non-Kosher food and will refuse to eat. This would endanger their life.
Another rationale is that the non-Kosher meat is intrinsically forbidden and is therefore something Megunah (disgusting)[5]. In contrast, the actions performed on Shabbos are only forbidden because it is Shabbos. We are allowed to push off the laws of Shabbos for the Choleh anyway, to light a fire and to cook. Therefore we may Shecht as well, rather than give them non-Kosher[6].
The Ra”n[7] gives a different explanation. Shechting an animal would be a single action incurring only 1 violation, albeit more severe. However, when eating non-Kosher food, one transgresses for each Kezayis volume that they eat. Even though eating non-Kosher food is less severe, the combined violations outweigh the singular violation of Shechting.
The Rebbe’s explanation of the Midrash is based on this rationale of the Ra”n. Why did Avraham fear that the Egyptians would kill him in order to take Sarah to Pharaoh instead of just taking her as a married woman?
If they did not kill Avraham, Pharaoh would be committing an act of adultery each time. In this case it would be preferable to kill Avraham, committing a one-off act of murder (like Shechting the animal on Shabbos), rather than violating multiple acts of adultery[8] (like the multiple violations when eating non-Kosher).
The Poskim discuss a number of Nafka Minas, practical differences between the reasons behind the ruling enumerated above.
Some suggest that according to the rationale of the Rosh, if we could hide the fact that the meat was not Kosher, so that there would be no concern that the sick person would refuse to eat it, it would be preferable to give them the non-Kosher meat[9]. Others disagree, writing that the concern is that they may come to find out that the meat is not Kosher. Even if they were to become aware after eating, their disgust at that point could endanger them.
If the sick person knows that the food is not Kosher and knows that they will not be disgusted because they understand that it is for Pikuach Nefesh, the reason of the Rosh would no longer apply and it would be preferable to eat the non-Kosher rather than Shecht on Shabbos[10].
The same would apply in other cases where there is no concern of the person being disgusted, such as a young child[11].
According to the reasoning of the Ra”n, it would make no difference whether the Choleh was unaware or if they consented to eat the non-Kosher food. We would still Shecht rather than allow them to transgress the multiple prohibitions.
Some Poskim question the opinion of the Ra”n. What if the Choleh does not require or is unable to eat a full Kezayis? Does the law change in this case?
When quoting the rationale of the Ra”n, the Magen Avraham[12] writes that one transgresses the Biblical prohibition of eating non-Kosher even if they eat less than a Kzayis volume[13]. The Kezayis volume is only the minimum volume required to be punishable. The implication is that every tiny amount eating is a separate Issur to which the Ran’s concern would apply.
Shulchan Aruch Harav[14] and other Acharonim[15] bring all 3 rationales for the Halacha. Ketzos Hashulchan learns that each one on its own would be sufficient to rely on.
Rabbinically Prohibited food
The Rishonim discuss the case of Neveilah, being food that is Biblically forbidden. Would we be allowed to Shecht (or cook) Kosher food in order to avoid giving the Choleh food that is Rabbinically forbidden, such as Chalav Akum or Bishul Akum?
The Pri Megadim[16] has a doubt in this case. Based on the rationale of the Rosh, perhaps a person only becomes disgusted by the thought of eating Biblically forbidden foods. If so, it would be preferable to give them the Rabbinically forbidden food. But perhaps we are concerned that a person will be disgusted at the prospect of eating even something that is only Rabbinically forbidden yes. In this case he says we rely on asking the Choleh[17].
According to the reasoning of the Ra”n, there is also a doubt. Do we say that multiple Rabbinic prohibitions when eating Rabbinically forbidden foods also outweigh a single Biblical prohibition such as Shechting on Shabbos? Or does this only apply to eating Biblically forbidden foods.
Whilst there are some Poskim[18] who rule leniently, most Acharonim[19] rule that it in this case, we must rather give the Choleh the Rabbinically forbidden food than to Biblically violate Shabbos to precure Kosher food. If the Shabbos violation to precure Kosher food is only Rabbinic, such as separating Terumah and Maaser, all opinions would rule that this is preferable to giving the Choleh Rabbinically forbidden food.
If the sick person is adamant that they will not eat the Rabbinically forbidden food and as a result there is a risk to their life, one may Shecht or perform Biblical violations to be able to give them food that they will eat.
An analogous case to these laws in a modern-day context would be if a person is sick in a hospital that has no Kosher food. Like Shechting, a Jew would be able to bring food to the hospital by carrying it through a Reshus Harabim, even though it would entail a Biblical Shabbos violation[20].
[1] Likutei Sichos volume 15 p487. Also see Torah Shleimah
[2] All of this assumes that the delay of having to slaughter an animal will not risk the patient’s life. If they need to eat immediately, they should be given whatever is available. Raavad. The case is where the Choleh specifically requires meat.
[3] The Rashb”a (Teshuvos 1:689) writes that according to the view that Shabbos is merely pushed aside (Hudcha) in cases of Pikuach Nefesh, it would be the same as the laws of Kashrus and accordingly we would give the sick person the non-Kosher food. The Mahram’s lenient ruling follows the opinion that the laws of Shabbos are completely permissible in cases of Pikuach Nefesh as though it was a weekday (Hutra). Since we follow the view that Shabbos is Hudcha, we would not follow the Maharam’s ruling.
[4] Yoma 14, Teshuvos Klal 26:5 based on the Mahara”m
[5] Non-Kosher food has a spiritual impact on the person who eats it (Ritzba).
[6] Shulchan Aruch Harav 328:16
[7] Yoma 4b
[8] See Likutei Sichos for an explanation why the act of adultery in this case would be a less-severe transgression than murder
[9] Imrei Binah
[10] Radba”z 4:200. Brought in Pri Megadim Eshel Avraham 328:10 and Elya Rabbah
[11] Kitzur Shulchan Aruch 92:8 and Ketzos Hashulchan 135:8
[12] 328:9
[13] The law of Chatzi Shiur Asur Min Hatorah
[14] 328:16
[15] See Aruch Hashulchan
[16] Eshel Avraham 328:9
[17] In the case of a Biblical prohibition we don’t rely on asking the Choleh
[18] Bach, Ta”z
[19] Magen Avraham 328:9, Shulchan Aruch Harav 328:16, Mishna Berura 328:39
[20] Some Poskim suggest that this only applies to walking the food to the hospital which entails a singular violation. However, when driving a petrol-car, one violates the Melacha of kindling constantly. According to the Ra”n this would not be permissible. However, according to the other reasonings, even this would be permissible.